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Martial art. The art of winning the soul by discourse (Plato).
A collection of stones piled with the aim of laying a mosaic. The style of the mo-
saic depends on the intentions of the craftsman, the time he lives in; thus every-
one leaves his individual mark (lichański).
The application of reason to imagination “for the better moving of the will” 
(bacon).
Summary
“all men [...] up to a certain point, endeavour to criticise or uphold an argument, to 
defend themselves or to accuse” (aristotle, 1959: 3). hence politicians cannot do oth-
erwise and “rhetoric as a technique of argument [...] rather than of ornamentation”, 
one of the oldest surviving disciplines (dixon, 1971: 14), whose insights and rules still 
possess the capacity to adjust to the ideological and social change (Cockcroft and 
Cockcroft, 2005: 3), is to forward the achievement of the goals politicians work to-
wards. In this study an attempt is made to depict the persuasive dialogue in the func-
tional language, i.e. the language of politicians in the Polish political arena. Prior to 
that, structuring the content of the article, a theoretical background and method-
ology are proposed based on The Art of Rhetoric by aristotle (1959). Three kinds of 
proofs, means of persuasion or structural principles by virtue of which the goal is attained, 
i.e. ethos, pathos and logos, are addressed. In the part to follow we will analyse several 
models of arguments which prevail in the political speeches as well as various means 
of rendering ethos and pathos.
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1. Introduction
Classical rhetoricians defined rhetoric as ars bene dicendi, the art of speaking well, the art or skill conveying bene aesthetic beauty and ethical value in dicendi oral and written texts (Wilczek, 2009: 8). 
Plato perceived it as the art of leading (“alluring” or “beguiling” – As-
mus, 1986: 156) the soul by means of words – seeing in it its deceptive na-
ture, while Gorgias called it “a means of fascination, peculiar psychago-
gia, spiritual seduction with a magical effect” (Kucz, 2009: 18), holding 
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“the power to effect ‘most divine’ deeds” (Asmus, 1986: 156). Aristotle 
(1959: 15) referred to rhetoric as the “the faculty of discovering the possi-
ble means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever”. He argued 
that rhetoric served “the function of no other of the arts, each of which 
was able to instruct and persuade in its own special subject”. Rhetoric 
was not so much to persuade as to find “the existing means of persua-
sion” (Aristotle, 1959: 13). This belief also “removes rhetoric from the 
realm of the haphazard and the fanciful” (Dixon, 1971: 14), the charge 
which was often filed by the Aristotle’s opponents.
Aristotle (1959: 3) in his definition of rhetoric compares rhetoric 
to dialectic, saying it is its “counterpart [...] for both have to do with 
matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not 
confined to any special science”. He explicates that “all men [...] up to 
a certain point, endeavour to criticise or uphold an argument, to defend 
themselves or to accuse”. However, it needs to be emphasised that some 
do it accidently, while others do so habitually. We can infer that some do 
not possess any knowledge of the art of rhetoric, while others grasped 
the insights and use it to their advantage. The above-mentioned defini-
tion applies to the language of politicians, who sometimes appear to crit-
icise or support an argument, or attempt to refute it, or defend it or ac-
cuse their opponents of some error in reasoning. It cannot, however, es-
cape our attention that in the contemporary language of politics, pub-
lic relations play a prominent role. Thus the arcane art of how to address 
the public is becoming or has already become an indispensable and re-
quired skill for every politician wishing to achieve success, even if doing 
so amounts to blurring his/her real positions. “Rhetoric as a technique 
of argument [...] rather than of ornamentation” (Dixon, 1971: 14) is to 
forward its achievement. Even if it constitutes one of the oldest surviv-
ing disciplines, its insights and rules still possess the capacity to adjust 
to the ideological and social change (Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005: 3).
2. Data Presentation
The persuasive dialogue in functional language, i.e. the language of 
politicians, constitutes the central focus of this article. The Art of Rhet-
oric by Aristotle (1959), in turn, serves as the theoretical background 
structuring the content of the article. Three kinds of proofs (ethos, pathos 
and logos) are discussed, followed by the elaboration of various models 
of argumentation.
The ultimate success of the persuasive dialogue is subject to the lan-
guage chosen to fit in with the subject of the interaction, the social con-
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text and the audience. Not only the persuader but also the persuadee 
needs to be involved, for the dialogic interaction entails reciprocal par-
ticipation and involvement. In the material examined we will concen-
trate on the pragmatic and linguistic techniques the persuader uses so as 
to influence the audience. The material comprises two presidential de-
bates held on 27th and 30th June 2010, between two candidates: Jarosław 
Kaczyński, representing Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice), and 
Bronisław Komorowski, the candidate of Platforma Obywatelska (Civ-
ic Platform). The data for the analysis come from the website of Gazeta 
Wyborcza: http://wyborcza.pl/. All the extracts have been translated by 
the author of the article.
3. Stages of Shaping the Composition
Cicero (1948: I. 142, quoted in Dixon, 1971: 24) presents a process 
of rhetorical composition, in which the orator “must first hit upon what 
to say; then manage and marshal his discoveries, not merely in orderly 
fashion, but with a discriminating eye for the exact weight of each ar-
gument; next go on to array them in the adornments of style; after that 
keep them guarded in his memory; and in the end deliver them with 
effect and charm”. The above-mentioned explication can be transferred 
into skills which consist of “five phases/stages” (Lichański, 2007: 87; 
Wilczek, 2009: 9–10): invention (inventio), arrangement or disposition 
(dispositio), style (elocutio), memory (memoria) and delivery (actio). Our 
attention, though, will be attached only to the first stage of the classical 
composition, namely inventio.
3.1. Inventio
Invention, being the skill of finding and collecting material, in-
cludes: proof, topics, and commonplaces (Dixon, 1971: 24; Lichański, 
2007: 96). Proof, according to Aristotle (1959: 15), can be inartificial or 
artificial, the latter denotes the invention of the speaker, the former the 
evidence of the law court (Dixon, 1971: 24). In turn, the artificial proof 
is subdivided into ethos, pathos and logos.
These three kinds of proofs, means of persuasion or structural prin-
ciples by virtue of which the goal is attained denote: ethos “the moral 
character of the speaker” (persuasion through personality and stance), 
pathos “putting the hearer into a  certain frame of mind” (persuasion 
through the arousal of emotion), and logos “the speech itself, in so far 
as it proves or seems to prove” (persuasion through reasoning) (Aristot-
le, 1959: 17).
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3.1.1. Ethos
Aristotle (1959) in defining ethos as depending upon “moral charac-
ter” stresses that it is the “moral character” of the orator that represents 
the most influential means of proof when persuading the audience. He 
explains that to persuade by means of perceived “moral character” the 
orator needs to deliver a speech in such a manner that the audience will 
find him/her worthy of confidence. Following Robert and Susan Cock-
croft (2005) ethos will be divided into personality and stance.
Personality is rendered as the power to win trust and confidence in 
the audience, impress them with individuality. Trust, as Garver (1994: 
132–138) and Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2005: 16) stress, comprises “mor-
al strength (arête), benevolence (eunoia)”, “constructive competence or the 
ability to offer shrewd, practical but principled advice (phronesis)”. As to 
the individuality, it translates into differentiating such traits of charac-
ter that would best suit the audience and the topic. What also affects the 
persuadee is the level of the individual engagement of the persuader, the 
higher the level appears to be, the more compelling the persuasion.
Stance equals the persuader’s viewpoint, vantage point, the issue 
which rests upon the source of the process of interaction, for the success 
of the exchange cannot be guaranteed in its absence. Stance is inherently 
interactive, and evinces group values, yet, it is entirely contingent upon 
the persuader.
The assessment and confidence of the audience placed in the per-
suader will be substantially dependent on the persuader’s stance, along 
with the personality and image. The persuader, on the other hand, must 
be attentive, observe, adjust to the needs of the audience, establish empa-
thy with the audience. Lynette Hunter (1984, quoted in Cockcroft and 
Cockcroft, 2005: 31) asserts that what matters is not the topic someone 
relies on, but the manner with which they do so. The persuader can as-
sume either a firm, rigid and authoritative stance; an indecisive and flex-
ible one; or suppress it before disclosing it later. The stance may take the 
form of a structured and ordered process of interaction or a disorgan-
ised and uncontrollable one. Nevertheless, as Quintilian (1920) upholds, 
no fixed rules are to be found that can facilitate persuasion. Still, prag-
matism, adaptability and flexibility in one’s stance are requisite in order 
that success is guaranteed. Human capability of choosing the rhetorical 
language facilitating persuasion cannot be excluded as well.
Hunter (1984, quoted in Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005: 32) also 
discriminates between positive and negative rhetoric, the former expli-
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cates the persuader’s stance as the interaction progresses, depicting shifts 
in stance; the latter conceals the values and the standpoint. The part 
the audience plays is equally significant. The audience must discern the 
stance, spot the strategy and evaluate its principles. For, as Hunter (ibid.) 
maintains, there is nothing worse than naiveté of the audience since it 
results in the audience surrendering to the imposed stance.
3.1.2. Ethos – Patterns of Behaviour Adopted by the Persuader
Coming back to the persuader’s stance, we shall propose a few pat-
terns of behaviour s/he can exhibit. To begin with, the persuader can 
prioritise a stance such that the audience perceives the benefits for them-
selves (positive face, Involvement Strategy (Scollon and Scollon, 1995)), 
seeks approval, the positive self-image (Brown and Levinson, 1987; 
Kasper, 1994; Scollon and Scollon, 1995; Fairclough 1989/2001; Fair-
clough, 1992/2008). The other pattern relies on the opposite assump-
tion, i.e. the persuader being in the privileged or empowered position 
threatens the audience with the exclusion of the benefits, hence plays 
on the emotions, pathos, of the audience (negative face – the want of 
self-determination, the claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to 
non-distraction). Tactics described above reflect the concept of saving or 
threatening face rooted in Brown and Levinson’s theory.1
As a subsequent tactic worth drawing our attention to, the persuad-
er may adopt lies on the belief that “being yourself” does not entail suc-
cess. Customarily, the persuader needs to implement intuition and cal-
culation in displaying his/her stance, determine how much of self, image 
and personality to propose so that it will not discourage a prospective 
listener. Too personal or too impersonal a stance can be equally coun-
ter-effective (Hunter, 1984).
Likewise, humour can serve as a tactic deployed by the persuader. 
It conveys either a release of tension, acts as a reflection of a non-serious 
stance, or an embodiment of the persuader’s personality, being the con-
sequence of his/her conviction. Lastly, it can also function as a gun that 
cons the audience into falsehood, ergo yields dubious benefits.
Changing sides by the persuader and his/her willingness to admit it 
openly constitutes a strategy which, if managed skilfully, can bring a de-
sirable effect. Nonetheless, it appears to be risky and requires a consid-
erable skill. For the inconsistency of stance can exert an adverse impact 
and lead to the feeling of distrust on the part of the audience (ibid.).
1 For details on the aspect of face with reference to the language of politicians, see Szczepańska-włoch 
(2010).
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Stance and personality are realised by basic features of language that, 
as Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2005: 38) suggest, “lay the foundations 
of meaning and human contact”. The dialectic of persuasion is to be 
grounded in three functions propounded by Halliday (1973), i.e. idea-
tional (ideas about the real world), interpersonal (social relationships), 
and textual (realisation of language choices). All the functions enumer-
ated must be fulfilled so that the persuasive character of ethos is commu-
nicated. The first one – ideational, say, can be realised by making use of 
the language depicting the persuadees’s experience; the second one – in-
terpersonal – by the use of modal verbs (expressing possibility, uncer-
tainty, criticism, expectation, etc.), and personal pronouns (showing dis-
tance); the textual function – by virtue of textual cohesion and coher-
ence: verb tense, syntax, word order and variation of sentence type.
To illustrate the above points and to see how politicians realise 
ethos, two extracts from the presidential debate held on 27th June 2010 
are presented. In the first extract Jarosław Kaczyński (a leader of Prawo 
i Sprawiedliwość) responds to the question on the equality of opportuni-
ties between regions in Poland:
(1) we have two conceptions in Poland. one, in short, is called the con-
ception of motor force and it is the conception of concentrating resourc-
es in those regions of the country in which we can already encounter 
a substantial level of prosperity, in addition, it has been estimated that the 
above-mentioned level of prosperity will later spread over other regions 
of our homeland. And there is the  conception of the  balanced develop-
ment, of which I am a  loyal supporter and which I developed when I was 
the Prime Minister. It is the conception of a special support for those re-
gions of Poland, which suffer – through no fault of theirs in general, most 
often through no fault of theirs – a certain backwardness. It was articulated 
by an algorithm of the implementation of the european funds, very bene-
ficial for the least favoured voivodeships [a voivodeship – a Polish admin-
istrative district equivalent to a province–ftn. JSw], in particular those in 
the east, as well as special programmes, which we managed to win for those 
voivodeships in brussels. In short, we are of the opinion that a “good” de-
velopment of Poland is equivalent to a balanced development, and it is es-
sentially in the interest of all of us. For the reason that nowhere in the world 
the development via those so-called motor forces – it has its scholarly name 
I will not allude to – brought desirable effects, islands of prosperity and the 
ocean of stagnation were established, or such spheres where the reverse 
process took place, where they were getting poorer. In short, it would be 
better if we do not try to implement that conception, I refer to it because 
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the present government has proposed such sorts of plans under such schol-
arly terms. Those are the plans which are not compatible with what is go-
ing on in Poland, since it is not that those metropolises are developing so 
rapidly in Poland, and, I repeat, that conception has not been checked any-
where in the world. here our standpoint is firm, my standpoint is univocal, 
as the President of the Republic of Poland, I will do everything to make Po-
land develop in a balanced manner.
After a brief introduction of two concepts of the economic reform 
of Poland, Jarosław Kaczyński openly presents his firm standpoint in 
saying “I am a loyal supporter”, via the use of the first person singular 
pronoun “I” he emphasises his view. Only twice does he use “I”, in the 
exordium and peroratio stages of the speech, to open and close his com-
position, with the aim of demonstrating his rigid stance (interperson-
al function). By contrast, in the course of his speech Kaczyński repeats 
the first person plural pronoun “we” four times, thus he identifies with 
his party and reflects their values, or wishes to “get closer” to the audi-
ence and warm (improve) his image (Fairclough, 1989/2001). Kaczyński 
also repeats the phrase: “through no fault of theirs in general, most of-
ten through no fault of theirs”, to claim common ground with the audi-
ence (ideational function), or rather prospective voters, i.e. the inhabit-
ants of the disadvantaged regions, the reason being to win their votes. By 
referring to the “so-called motor force” and “scholarly term”, he depreci-
ates the government’s policy, moreover, with a derogatory tone. Further, 
he claims common ground with the people, distances himself from the 
world of science, often perceived as foreign to the average citizen of the 
country2. Subsequently, he refutes the opponent’s idea by displaying its 
uselessness. He concludes his speech by confirming his stance.
In the second excerpt Bronisław Komorowski (a candidate of Plat-
forma Obywatelska for the presidential seat), being interviewed about 
the problem of legalization of homosexual relationships, declares:
(2) So, there is a question whether a new law should be established. For in 
accordance with the Polish law, in effect at present, there is a possibility for 
inheriting, there is a possibility for medical care for all the people living in 
such relationships, which are not marriages, except for a few cases concern-
ing, among others, adoption rights I cannot imagine that in Poland such 
a bill can ever be brought forward to the president’s office, since it is some-
2 It needs to be emphasised that politicians appear to juggle that strategy; depending on the aim they 
strive to achieve they either distance themselves from the world of science or show their affiliation 
with it.
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thing different to create possibilities for living together and taking care of 
each other, and inheriting, and it is something different to go in the direc-
tion of mechanisms, or regulations, which concern a sphere, or a tradition-
al model of family. I suppose that it is rather a fancy question, because I don’t 
expect that such a legislative initiative is probable in the nearest future, it is 
rather being talked about in quite narrow circles. one should be decent to-
wards everyone, we should not be too inquisitive about the private lives of 
others, but we can also solve problems of people living in such relationships 
decently, in accordance with the law currently in effect. If it turned out that 
something is missing, that some mechanisms require polishing up, that, for 
example, there is no easy access to medical care, when somebody goes to 
hospital, so such a bill should be enforced in the name of political decency. 
but we shouldn’t mix it with a problem of marriage, adoption or other situa-
tions of that type, which are confined to the marriage of people of different 
sex.
The question posed by the interviewer appears to be somewhat con-
troversial, especially for a politician representing a right-wing and centre-
right-wing party. Nevertheless, even if Komorowski evades answering 
the question, he does not conceal his standpoint. Later, we can decipher 
that he is in favour of a traditional family model, though, it is expressed 
covertly (ideational function). He makes use of hedges of casual conver-
sation, such as “I suppose”, modal verbs: “can”, negative form of “can” – 
“cannot”, “should”, a conditional structure to avoid answering (textual 
function). He does so in the face of an oncoming election and in order 
not to discourage a part of his electorate. Komorowski’s lexical choice, 
the use of colloquial or humorous words, e.g. “fancy” (in Polish wydu-
many denoting something “unlikely, improbable, fake” (Słownik Języka 
Polskiego), or “trivial, made-up, far-fetched” (Słownik Synonimów)) or a 
not very complex syntax, as well as an impersonal style also serve to cre-
ate his positive image (interpersonal function). The aforementioned fac-
tors contribute to the adaptability and flexibility of the candidate, fac-
tors which guarantee success in the political discourse, which in turn is 
persuasive in its nature.
To recapitulate, Quintilian maintains that “no man can be a good 
orator unless he is a good man” (Non posse oratorem esse nisi virum bonum 
– Quintilian, 1907: 416 [12,1,1], quoted in Kucz, 2009: 31). Plato (1973: 
83), on the other hand, holds that the persuader is an “expert in rhetor-
ical subtlety”, equipped with the knowledge of speech cohesion and co-
herence (structure of the speech) enabling to offer proof, but without 
any insight into and consideration of truthfulness or real knowledge of 
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the subject. Which perception appears to be closer to the contemporary 
definition of the persuader-politician? With the power of PR prevailing 
in the public eye, shaping the ethos of every celebrity in such a manner 
that by means of distinctiveness s/he becomes persuasive, losing the real 
meaning on the way, the answer is: the latter. Today, Aristotelian ethos 
is substituted for a highly powerful “image” exerting a considerable ef-
fect on the persuasive language, the success of which is often founded on 
the image (dress, speech), and political charisma (voice, language, or ap-
pearance).
3.1.3. Pathos
Pathos is equivalent to persuasion through an emotion that is 
roused (Aristotle, 1959: 17), thus the orator by virtue of “a certain frame 
of mind” entices the audience. The persuader will intentionally use an 
emotional appeal, which many a time constitutes a source of distrust of 
rhetoric, owing to “its association with insincerity, irrationality and rab-
ble-rousing” (Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005: 55). It seems that there is 
no other way but to employ emotions to manipulate the audience. Af-
ter all, as Damasio (1999, quoted in Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005: 55) 
holds “humans cannot think properly unless, as a prior condition, they 
feel”. Downes (2000, in Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005: 55) adds that 
what we feel mirrors what we think by means of semiotic systems, i.e. 
verbal and non-verbal signs. Nonetheless, it should be propounded that 
emotions can obscure the view, preventing people from gaining a broad-
er and a true perspective on the issues raised, and when out of control 
can threaten and discourage the audience.
Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2005: 57) propose two kinds of emotions: 
universal and contingent. The former reflects emotions common to hu-
manity (e.g. joy, anger, fear), the latter emotions as socially conditioned 
manifestation (e.g. pride, contempt, indignation, guilt). Both are cul-
ture-specific, context-dependent, historically-bound and central to per-
suasive rhetoric. Both are present in literary and functional persuasion, 
though universal emotion is often associated with literary persuasion or 
formal discourse (Nash, 1989).
The use of pathos by the orator will in a substantial manner depend 
on the agreement between the persuader, the topic and the audience in 
a  socially structured context. Notwithstanding, it is within the abili-
ty of the speaker or writer that s/he adjusts the language to match the 
topic raised and to appeal to the audience. Therefore it is language that 
plays a vital role in the persuasive discourse. It is also via language that 
What Do We Know about the World? 212
the standpoint, the prejudices the persuader holds are unveiled. Ergo at 
this point we return to the interdependence of thought, feeling, and lan-
guage (and its social context).3
Following Cicero and Quintilian (1920), vivid and graphic language 
appears to be a persuasive factor, enabling the actualisation of emotions. 
The above-mentioned authors use energeia and fantasia to influence the 
hearer, energeia renders clarity, fantasia imagination. A subsequent fac-
tor carrying a highly persuasive aim, somewhat different than the above 
one, is the use of abstract concepts, such as honour, patriotism, or justice. 
The orator making use of the cited concepts may move the audience sub-
stantially by alluding to the topics they regard highly. Such a strategy re-
sorts to the individual strongly-held beliefs and values, which assure the 
audience of the truthfulness of the persuader and arouse greater confi-
dence in him. Again, we revert to the pragmatic concept of face, in the 
aforesaid example we can perceive positive face realised by claiming com-
mon ground, the approval of each other, shared wants and shared knowl-
edge, and reciprocity of obligations (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 62).
Finally, it should be borne in mind that playing on pathos can either 
facilitate the understanding of a logical argument, helping to acknowl-
edge it, or obscure the logical judgement of an argument advanced by the 
persuader. The persuader wishing to be effective in the art of persuasion 
must acquire all skills indispensable in influencing the audience, should 
monitor the response, converge with beliefs and convictions of the au-
dience, reverse his own standpoint, if required. It becomes clear that 
the persuader must acquire psycholinguistic knowledge, i.e. the com-
plexities of the human character, so as to rate the responses of the audi-
ence and shape them effectively. All the ploys stated above are realised 
by means of language, which occupies a paramount role. Pathos is actu-
alised with the help of argument and repetition, together with stylistic 
structures, such as antithesis, metaphors and rhythmic patterns, syntac-
tic structures, i.e. fronting, word order, interrogatives, and lexis, i.e. vivid 
and descriptive adjectives (Nash, 1989; Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005).
3 At this point I wish to draw our attention to the significance of language and its social context in the 
process of discourse analysis. I advocate a view that language does not exist in isolation. Fairclough 
(1989/2001, 1992/2008) in his framework for the textual analysis of discourse or critical discourse 
analysis explicates that no analysis is reliable without careful examination of three dimensions: tex-
tual, discursive and social. Van dijk (1998), in turn, stresses that language users in a communicative 
act rely on social acts, participate in a form of dialogue, which cannot be isolated from social and cul-
tural context. Finally, bourdieu (2008) highlights that language does not exist for its own sake, lan-
guage is determined by the relation it bears with the speakers who bring it into use and who possess 
language competence, therefore to interact the whole social structure is required.
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The following passage is taken from the presidential debate held on 27th 
June 2010, Bronisław Komorowski responds to the question on the sep-
aration of state and church, as well as financing in vitro fertilization:
(3) ladies and gentleman, not only do I understand a problem of pater-
nity, but also, simply, raised five children. Five times did I experience happi-
ness of being a parent, a father, and I am the last person who would wish to 
deprive young marriages or couples of hope, chances, and there are twenty 
per cent of couples in Poland, who cannot have children. [...]. but we cannot 
deprive others of that hope. The issues concerning a system of faith, or an 
ethical one – here everyone needs to take decisions in his own conscience 
whether to employ such method, regarding it as effective, or not. Personally, 
I was, am and will be a supporter of the conciliar principle in effect between 
the church and the state, namely mutual respect, respect for the autono-
my of the church by the state and the state by the church [...]. but the com-
promise is of high importance, the compromise which was arrived at while 
working on the anti-abortion law, which allows specific exceptions connect-
ed also to human life, but it is utterly the law protecting life. I was, am and 
will always be an advocate of life, I have experienced happiness five times, life 
of my own children, welcoming lives of my own children, I will not deny an-
ybody the right to happiness.
Bearing in mind the theoretical background on pathos explicat-
ed above, we can enumerate a number of ploys to which Bronisław Ko-
morowski resorts, the first being the use of abstract concepts, e.g. hap-
piness, hope, faith, conscience, ethics, religion. By evoking abstract catego-
rization, Komorowski appeals to the emotions of the audience reflect-
ing their values, aspirations and experience, the concept of positive face 
is also brought into play. He is aware of the fact that by alluding to the 
concepts the audience prizes greatly, he will win their votes. Moreover, 
he places himself in the position of an expert owing to the experience 
he has gained, making himself worthy of being trusted. Komorowski is 
sure of his opinion and voices it firmly. Nevertheless, finding some space 
for a compromise he, conversely, displays openness and flexibility. In the 
field of the stylistic and syntactic structures we can also spot some exam-
ples, i.e. rhythmic patterns, emphatic structures and repetition.
3.1.4. Logos
Logos denotes “reasoned discourse”, argument from reason. Accord-
ing to Aristotle (1959: 17), logos relates to “the speech itself, in so far as it 
proves or seems to prove”. Persuasion “by speech itself” can be achieved 
only if “the true” or “apparently true” can be extracted from the ways 
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of persuasion within the particular subject. Paul A. Rahe (2008: 23) 
adds that logos “makes it possible [...] to perceive and make clear to oth-
ers through reasoned discourse the difference between what is advanta-
geous and what is harmful, between what is just and what is unjust, and 
between what is good and what is evil”, which undeniably differentiates 
us from animals.
Logos is composed of an issue lying at the heart of a debate which 
needs to be identified, arguments which will support the issue ad-
dressed, the structure of thought which underpins the arguments, co-
herence and logical value.
Prior to examining which classes of arguments the speakers or writ-
ers employ in the persuasive process of the genre under investigation, we 
shall elaborate on their types. Aristotle (1959: 265) distinguishes three 
classes of arguments which need to be applied by the orators, firstly, the 
topic of the possible and impossible, secondly, that a thing will happen 
or has happened, thirdly, the topic of magnitude. The possible explicates 
that of two contrary things one is possible, so is the other one; analogi-
cally, if of two similar things, one is possible, so is the other one (an argu-
ment a fortiori). The possible, therefore, constitutes the source of argu-
ments for the impossible being the opposite of what has been said about 
the possible. As to a thing that will happen or has happened, Aristot-
le (1959: 173–273) maintains that if a foundation is laid to believe or if 
a certain premise has been made that something has happened or will 
happen, then something will most probably have happened. Finally, to-
pos of magnitude, Aristotle (ibid.) holds that all men use extenuation 
and amplification (exaggeration of both great and small things) in de-
liberating, praising or blaming, accusing or defending, for “the particu-
lar has more authority than the general”. Not only can the topics of ar-
gument stimulate the persuader’s mind, but also structure the persua-
sive discourse, enabling the speaker/writer to make use of all available 
means, which consequently serve the speaker in preparing his/her com-
positions. Nevertheless, topics, if applied too scrupulously, can deprive 
a composition of its originality and inventiveness.
Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2005: 83–107), in turn, provide us with 
ten models of argument, as they call them, substituting topoi with mod-
els, meaning “adaptable, flexible concepts”, offering “systematic and or-
ganising methods of ‘thinking through’ a topic, and of selecting and or-
ganising the most effective arguments”. The models of argument which 
will be discussed are as follows: definition, cause and effect, similarity, op-
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positional, degree, testimony, genus/species, part/whole, associational, and 
root meaning.
The definition model of argument implies that the speaker or writer 
makes use of the general category so as to move to the unique feature of 
a point discussed. Thus, in a persuasive discourse every definition might 
incite a counter-definition. The cause and effect model embodies an in-
tegral part of a persuasive process, both in literary and functional dis-
course, although it takes a different form in each of them. In the lan-
guage of politicians, which is our central focus, it is effect-centred, since 
the said ploy seems to be more convincing. Nonetheless, it is not devoid 
of predicaments (e.g. oversimplification, disproportion etc.) Cockcroft 
and Cockcroft (ibid.) identify three processes of cause and effect, the 
first being a simple cause producing a simple effect, the second a complex 
cause producing a simple effect, the last one a complex cause producing 
a complex effect. We need to accentuate that the cause and effect model is 
grounded in the dialectical process. Comparison and parallelism emerge 
to be the key issues of the similarity model of argument. The oppositional 
model, on the other hand, depicts contradictory motifs. We can enumer-
ate a few sub-varieties of the model: contraries, contradictions, privatives 
and relatives. Similarly to the cause and effect model, the aforementioned 
model of argument is present in a dialectical process, involving two-way 
interaction, not infrequent in the language of politicians, in which one 
thread of thinking is adopted ruling out at the same time the other one. 
Such an argument lies at the basis of provocation. The degree model of ar-
gument constitutes the third common topos referred to in political rheto-
ric by Aristotle, together with the similarity and oppositional models. It 
rests upon constant dynamics, desirability of a goal, instrumental means 
of achieving it (ibid.). The subsequent type, i.e. the testimony model, is 
founded on the credibility of a witness, as a consequence it is considered 
as one of the weakest topics. The testimony model is to be encountered 
in television broadcasts, notably political interviews, for its declarative 
function, in which the political figures display their loyalty and support 
for a particular standpoint or a political party or offers certain instruc-
tion, hence it often acts as an ideological weapon. The genus/species type 
of argument carries an interactional function, in which the speakers af-
ter initiating a discussion, making a statement, refute each other’s argu-
ments, moving from genus to species, or further to sub-species. The part/
whole model appears to correspond to the previous model of argument. 
What differentiates it from the former is that the genus/species can exist 
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separately, while parts and wholes are co-dependent. In the association-
al model the hearer is manipulated by false logical and ethical assump-
tions. The above argument can be sub-divided into subject/adjunct (a 
quality, condition of a subject being its basis), lifestyle/status (an argu-
ment, the basis of which being lifestyle/status), place/function (place/
function taking the role of a premise), or time/activity (an argument re-
flecting people’s expectations and social rituals) association models of 
argument (ibid.). Lastly, the root meaning category of argument typifies 
one of the most manipulative models of argument, the persuader chang-
es the received meaning of a word used and searches for the hidden or al-
ternative meaning.
3.1.5. Models of Argument Versus Language of Politicians
After having examined two presidential debates held on 27th and 30th 
June 2010, we can come to a number of conclusions. Firstly, there are sev-
eral models of argument which prevail in the political speeches – name-
ly, cause and effect, degree, genus and species, associational and opposition-
al (of dialectical nature); the rationale being its persuasive and emotive 
functions, as well as vivid distinctiveness in the values and standpoint 
the politicians have adopted. Secondly, the remaining models are either 
too sophisticated and would require greater expertise or are not benefi-
cial enough to be used in the political discourse. Lastly, the choice of ar-
guments is highly dependent on loyalty and ideology of a politician, the 
party s/he adheres to determines a line of attack he pursues.
Let us now provide a few examples of the above-mentioned models:
1/ definition model of argument, in which a generalisation is narrowed 
down into a precise meaning: 
(4) Jarosław Kaczyński: [...] privatization, as I have already said, conveys an 
introduction of entirely different rules of the game. A private hospital will 
have a possibility to sign an agreement with the National Fund, though it 
will not be required, and there is every likelihood that such a situation will 
take place that people belonging to a low income group will simply not have 
an easy access to treatment, at least in their towns/cities.
2/ cause and effect model of argument, Bronisław Komorowski by means 
of a conditional sentence explicates that the effect of a fall of a stand-
ard of living will be emigration to Great Britain – a simple effect 
produced by a simple cause; in the second example granted that lib-
eral ideology is challenged, Poland will become a more prosperous 
country – seemingly4 a simple effect of a simple cause:
4 I deliberately use the word “seemingly” for the argument is simple only in wording.
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(5) bronisław Komorowski: If the standard of living is improved, nobody 
will go to Great britain.
(6) Jarosław Kaczyński: [...] only when we reject liberal ideology [...] only 
then will we bring about development of Poland.
3/ similarity model of argument – the following example rests upon 
parallelism of the process, the speaker’s understanding of a problem 
is linked to his memory-based schemata, that is the speaker’s experi-
ence:
(7) bronisław Komorowski: ladies and gentleman, not only do I under-
stand a problem of paternity, but I also, simply, raised five children.
4/ oppositional model of argument – the example below is grounded in 
a  dialectical process, involving two-way interaction between two 
participants. Jarosław Kaczyński responds to the question on equal 
opportunities between Poland A and B. He firmly states that such 
a division is present in Poland; at the same time he provides solu-
tions to the problem. In turn, Bronisław Komorowski denies that 
the division exists (the argument Bronisław Komorowski employed 
might have been borrowed from Barak Obama’s 2004 Democrat-
ic Convention Keynote speech in which he said that “There are no 
red states. There are no blue states. There is only the United States 
of America”, the speech that earned Barak Obama widespread and 
well-deserved recognition with respect to successful rhetoric):
(8) bronisław Komorowski: There is one Poland, there is neither Poland 
A nor b, nor C nor d. There is no north, south, west or east Poland. There is 
one Poland and we need to take care of it, and the government does it.
5/ degree model of argument – both examples are founded on the qual-
itative aspect of argument saying that one thing is better/cheaper, 
etc. than another one:
(9) bronisław Komorowski: It is important for the professional army, such 
is always better [...]
(10) bronisław Komorowski: For sure Poland is much stronger than in 
1997 [...]
6/ testimony model of argument – considered one of the weakest of to-
poi, however, in the political discourse it may be used as an ideo-
logical weapon. In the example to follow, the interviewee instructs 
the audience how to act, he also accentuates his stance by the use of 
anaphora:
(11) Jarosław Kaczyński: It is an old teaching of Giedroyć, it is an old teach-
ing of Józef Piłsudski, we should make use of it and we should all go this way.
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7/  genus/species model of argument – the following dialectical model of 
argument is based on the pattern: genus to species, species to sub-spe-
cies, etc. By way of illustration, Bronisław Komorowski makes an 
assumption, in turn Jarosław Kaczyński counters this assumption 
with a  subsequent example, the procedure further continues. In 
the example to follow we can also spot aitiologia (a rhetorical figure 
(trope), in which the same speaker asks and later answers a question 
posed), a ploy popular in  political rhetoric:
(12) bronisław Komorowski: Facts are on our side: is there half a billion for 
the university of Rzeszów? Yes, there is. Is there an improvement of an al-
gorithm calculating money for health sector? Yes, there is. You took it away, 
we will give it and that’s the difference. There is no point in alluding to the-
ories, of one kind or another, facts are unrelenting (undeniable) Mr Chair-
man, and that’s all, full stop. 
Jarosław Kaczyński: I also have some time, so I will say: half a billion is much 
less than, for example, twelve billion for Gęsicka’s plans. well, Mr Speaker, 
you won’t escape from it.
bronisław Komorowski: well, Mr Chairman, you can promise twelve bil-
lion, but you didn’t give a penny, but we will give half a billion.
Jarosław Kaczyński: It came from the european funds.
8/ part/whole model of argument – in which the part represents the 
whole, in the example below, the speaker enumerates consequences 
of an economic crisis pertaining to supply estimates and public ex-
penditure, which represent parts of a larger whole:
(13) bronisław Komorowski: The Italians cut clerks’ salaries, pensions [...]
9/ associational model of argument – it provokes the user to make false 
logical assumptions, as may be the case of the example to follow:
(14) Jarosław Kaczyński: [...] contrary to what the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of that government claims, so I presume so does Mr Speaker [...]
10/ root meaning model of argument – characteristic of manipulation, 
the interviewee deliberately searches for an alternative meaning of 
a word to manipulate. In the context mentioned the speaker uses 
the word: “report” sarcastically, for it was uttered by the brother of 
his opponent after he won the election in 2005, in the form: I report 
that the task has been completed (originally the statement was not 
used to display complete dependence, which this word may denote, 
but to express contentment resulting from victory). Bronisław Ko-
morowski, however, attempts to distort the meaning by referring to 
it literally since he wishes to show that he is an independent politi-
cian:
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(15) bronisław Komorowski: [...] I will not file a report to the Prime Minis-
ter [...]
4. Conclusion
In every discourse where persuasion is the primary goal we observe 
the co-existence of the structural principles: ethos, pathos and logos. The 
type of interaction, personality, stance, as well as emotional appeal may 
determine the choice of arguments. Conversely, the choice of arguments 
may reflect the influence arguments exert on emotions and standpoint 
adopted by the persuader. The process is simultaneous. Quintilian (quot-
ed in Dixon, 1971: 25) maintained that every aspect of speech enhances 
character: the tone reveals the orator’s good will towards the audience, 
the ordering of arguments reflects his/her intelligence and sense of val-
ues, while the feelings expressed embody the goodness of his/her heart. 
Ergo the orator should be able to comprehend psychology, know the val-
ues of the audience and respond to them effectively and truthfully.
Tactics employed by the speaker include postulating the irrelevance 
of the opponent’s argument, by showing its ambiguity, inconsistency or 
preposterousness. In effective persuasion the issue, the arguments and 
their relevance must stand in line since an attentive hearer will perceive 
any incoherence and lack of cohesion upon which they are grounded. 
Correspondingly, the more the persuader understands his audience, the 
more s/he will be compelling.
According to classical rhetoric, all the arguments are or can be po-
lar opposites, “either/or”, hence they can limit a  free mind. The com-
position, structurally controlled, systematised and classified, may cramp 
a free development of ideas. Aristotelian rhetoric offers a form of argu-
ment, not a  compromise, agony being its aim (Dixon, 197; Budzyńs-
ka-Daca, 2008). The language of politics appears to draw interest from 
that rhetoric, in which it has inexorably settled, for the aim of the politi-
cal discourse is tantamount to that of rhetoric, even if it has, in the opin-
ion of its opponents, become morally suspect, “the art of the purple pas-
sage and the debating trick, language masquerading as thought” (Dix-
on, 1971: 1–2, 70), language used so as to “influence, persuade, perhaps 
to exhort and instruct”, language used to manipulate, language requir-
ing consummate skills. 
In sum, on one hand, we can defend a  position adopted by Cap 
(2005, 2006, quoted in Skowrońska, 2010), who upholds that “skilful 
use of language is not only an asset, but a must in legitimization” of pol-
itics, “broadly defined as the ultimate goal sought by politicians”. On 
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the other one, following Chilton (2004: 23), we can accept the assump-
tion that every political speaker needs to “imbue their utterances with 
evidence, authority and truth”. According to Aristotle, word has to be 
bound with being, as a remedy for abuse and manipulation within hu-
man cognition (Stefańczyk, 2000, quoted in Kucz, 2009: 22). The ques-
tion arises: does anybody attach any importance to actions in the era 
of power of mass media? Do actions speak louder than words? High-
ly debatable. A word is the weapon in Plato’s rhetoric, something you 
use to fight with the opponent’s view, or rather with him/her in person, 
something you apply to defend, refute or maintain the stance adopted, 
something fulfilling a conative function, finally, something lying on the 
brink of manipulation. Ergo does rhetoric render martial art or the art 
of winning the soul by discourse? Both, depending on the perspective 
we adopt or, more probable, on the goal a politician wishes to achieve.
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